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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION 
TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on October 26, 2016, at 2:00 PM, in Courtroom 2, 17th 
Floor, United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Phillip Burton Federal 
Building & United States Courthouse, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, 
Defendant Twitter, Inc. (“Twitter” or “Defendant”) shall and hereby does move for an order 
dismissing with prejudice all claims presented in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint.  This 
motion is supported by the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities and such other 
written or oral argument as may be presented at or before the time this motion is taken under 
submission by the Court. 
STATEMENT OF REQUESTED RELIEF 
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), Defendant Twitter requests that the Court dismiss 
with prejudice all claims presented in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE DECIDED 
1. Whether 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Section 230”), which broadly immunizes online 
intermediaries from liability for harms allegedly resulting from third-party content, bars 
this action, which seeks to hold Twitter liable under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) based on 
allegations that Twitter failed to block or remove accounts that ISIS affiliates allegedly 
used to transmit terrorist content via Twitter’s online communications platform. 
2. Whether the Second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim under the federal 
Terrorism Civil Remedy Provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), because: 
a. The Second Amended Complaint fails to allege facts that would establish that Twitter 
proximately caused the deaths of Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach; and  
b. The Second Amended Complaint fails to allege facts that would establish that Twitter 
committed an “act of international terrorism” within the meaning of that provision. 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (SAC) suffers from the same flaws as Plaintiffs’ 
First Amended Complaint (FAC) and should be dismissed for the same reasons that this Court 
dismissed the FAC.  See Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 2016 WL 4205687 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2016) 
(Dkt. No. 47).  The SAC relies entirely on one of the two theories that Plaintiffs advanced in 
their opposition to Twitter’s previous motion to dismiss and that this Court has already 
rejected—the theory that Twitter should be held liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries because Twitter 
allegedly failed to block or remove accounts used by ISIS affiliates or supporters to allegedly 
transmit terrorist content over Twitter’s online platform.  Attempting to support that theory, the 
SAC largely repleads the same allegations as the FAC but in a different order and under different 
headings, while occasionally sprinkling in allegations that “Twitter knowingly and recklessly 
provided ISIS with accounts on its social network.”  SAC ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 48 (emphasis added).1 
In dismissing the FAC, this Court held that Plaintiffs’ “provision of accounts” theory is 
barred by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).  See Fields, 
2016 WL 4205687, at *6-*8.  Nothing in the SAC suffices to disturb that conclusion.  First, just 
like the FAC, the SAC is “riddled with detailed descriptions of ISIS-related messages, images, 
and videos disseminated through Twitter and the harms allegedly caused by the dissemination of 
that content.”  Id. at *6.  Putting labels aside—as Section 230 requires—the SAC continues to 
“describe a theory of liability based on Twitter’s knowing failure to prevent ISIS from 
disseminating content through the Twitter platform, not its mere provision of accounts to ISIS,” 
and so runs afoul Section 230. Id. at *5.  Second, as this Court explained, Twitter’s decisions 
                                                 
1 Plaintiffs seem to abandon the second theory that they pressed in their opposition to Twitter’s 
motion to dismiss—that by making a direct messaging tool widely available, Twitter had 
provided material support to terrorists or to a designated terrorist organization.  The SAC still 
relies on direct messaging to support its assertion that Twitter proximately caused Plaintiffs’ 
injuries.  SAC ¶¶ 43-45 (alleging ISIS recruited new members by sending direct messages to 
potential recruits).  But it no longer alleges that Twitter’s provision of a direct messaging service 
constituted a form of material support.  In any event, for the reasons this Court has already given, 
Section 230 precludes any direct messaging theory.  Fields, 2016 WL 4205687, at *9-*10; see 
also Reply, Dkt. No. 32 at 7-9. 
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about who may open or keep an account—and so who may post content to its platform—are 
themselves publisher choices about what content may be posted.  See id. at *6-*8.  Because the 
“provision of accounts” theory on which the SAC relies turns on “Twitter’s alleged violation of a 
‘duty … derive[d] from [its] status or conduct as a publisher,’” it is barred by Section 230.  Id. at 
*6 (quoting Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009)).  Third, the SAC 
confirms that content created by third parties is essential to Plaintiffs’ attempts to plead and 
prove that Twitter proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries:  The SAC now expressly groups many 
of its allegations about content created by third parties under the new heading “Twitter 
Proximately Caused Plaintiffs’ Injuries.”  SAC at 6; id. ¶¶ 41-71.  The SAC’s new structure thus 
further reinforces the conclusion that Plaintiffs seek to hold Twitter responsible for harms arising 
from third-party content, and not “Twitter’s mere provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS.”  Fields, 
2016 WL 4205687, at *9.  For each of these reasons, Section 230 once again requires that 
Plaintiffs’ claims be dismissed.  
This Court also held that under any proximate cause standard “the allegations in the FAC 
do not support a plausible inference of proximate causation between Twitter’s provision of 
accounts to ISIS and the deaths of Fields and Creach.”  Fields, 2016 WL 4205687, at *9.  The 
SAC attempts to escape that holding by replacing the allegation that Abu Zaid was a “lone wolf” 
who had been inspired by ISIS’s brutal execution of Jordanian pilot al-Kassasbeh, FAC ¶¶ 80, 
84, with an allegation that he had once belonged to an ISIS sleeper cell, SAC ¶ 81.  But this 
Court was aware of Plaintiffs’ sleeper cell allegation before issuing its decision, see Mot. to 
Dismiss Hearing Tr., Dkt. No. 40, at 14:9-11, and did not rely on the FAC’s “lone wolf” 
allegation in the Order dismissing the FAC, Fields, 2016 WL 4205687, at *8-*9.  Whatever the 
connection between Abu Zaid and ISIS, the SAC adds nothing to support the only connection 
that could matter—i.e., one between Abu Zaid and Twitter.  For this reason as well, the SAC 
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under the Terrorism Civil Remedy Provision. 
During the motion to dismiss hearing, the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend in large 
part so that Plaintiffs could get the “complaint in the shape that [they would] like it for more 
receptive ears, if mine don’t work out the way that you want them.”  Mot. to Dismiss Hearing Tr. 
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at 27:5-8.  By merely reshuffling the same allegations and doubling down on theories that this 
Court has already rejected, Plaintiffs have made clear that they have already turned their 
attention to what they hope will be “more receptive ears.”  Twitter respectfully urges the Court to 
speed Plaintiffs on their way by dismissing the Second Amended Complaint with prejudice.   
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 The allegations in the SAC are laid out differently than the allegations in the FAC, but 
are otherwise nearly identical.  Like the FAC, the SAC alleges that a terrorist named Abu Zaid 
shot and killed Lloyd “Carl” Fields, Jr. and James Damon Creach in a terrorist attack on 
November 9, 2015 in Amman, Jordan, and that ISIS subsequently claimed responsibility for the 
attack.  SAC ¶¶ 1, 78, 80.  The SAC again fails to allege that Twitter had anything to do with the 
attack itself or that its platform was ever used by Abu Zaid.  It also continues to contain no 
allegations that ISIS recruited Abu Zaid through Twitter’s online platform, or that he or ISIS 
used the Twitter platform to plan, carry out, or raise money for the attack.  Instead, once again, 
the sole alleged connection between Twitter and the attack in Jordan is that some of the hundreds 
of millions of individuals who maintained Twitter accounts before the attack were allegedly 
affiliated with or sympathetic to ISIS and allegedly used Twitter’s platform to recruit new 
members, id. ¶¶ 42-52, fundraise, id. ¶¶ 53-57, and spread propaganda, id. ¶¶ 58-71.  And, once 
again, the SAC does not allege that Twitter created any of this content.  According to Plaintiffs, 
however, Twitter should have “take[n] a more proactive approach to countering terrorist 
messages and recruitment online.”  SAC ¶ 32.  Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs seek treble 
money damages from Twitter under the Terrorism Civil Remedy Provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).  
Id. ¶¶ 84-87 (based on alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A); ¶¶ 88-91 (based on alleged 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B). 
 The principle difference between the SAC and the FAC is cosmetic:  Plaintiffs have 
attempted to segregate their allegations about Twitter providing ISIS with accounts from their 
allegations about the information ISIS or its supporters posted or sent through those accounts.  
Allegations about accounts that previously were scattered throughout the FAC are now grouped 
at the top of the SAC under new, account-focused headers such as “Twitter Provided Accounts 
Case 3:16-cv-00213-WHO   Document 49   Filed 09/13/16   Page 8 of 18
  
Case No. 3:16-cv-00213-WHO 5 
 
Defendant Twitter’s Motion to Dismiss 
Second Amended Complaint 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
To ISIS,” and “Twitter Provided Accounts To ISIS Knowingly And Recklessly.”  SAC at 2; id. 
¶¶ 9-40.  And many of the FAC’s prior allegations about how ISIS used those accounts to 
transmit content promoting ISIS’s purposes have been consolidated under the new heading 
“Twitter Proximately Caused Plaintiffs’ Injuries.”  Id. at 6; id. ¶¶ 41-71.  Some content-focused 
allegations continue to appear in other parts of the SAC, however, most notably in allegations 
faulting Twitter for inadequately policing its platform.  Id. ¶¶ 30, 32, 36, 37, 40.  Plaintiffs have 
also replaced their allegation that Abu Zaid was a “lone wolf” who had been inspired by ISIS’s 
horrific execution of Jordanian pilot Maaz al-Kassasbeh, FAC ¶¶ 80, 84, with an allegation that, 
according to Israeli military intelligence, Abu Zaid had been part of a clandestine ISIS terror cell 
at al-Mutah University in al-Karak, Jordan, SAC ¶¶ 80-81.  None of these changes are 
unexpected:  Plaintiffs’ opposition to Twitter’s motion to dismiss the FAC relied heavily on a 
“provision of accounts” theory, Dkt. No. 31, and Plaintiffs advised the Court of the allegation 
that Abu Zaid had been part of an “ISIS sleeper cell” at the motion to dismiss hearing, see Mot. 
to Dismiss Hearing Tr., Dkt. 40, 14:9-11.  In addition, the SAC acknowledges Twitter’s recent 
announcement “that it has suspended 235,000 accounts since February [2016] for promoting 
terrorism.”  SAC ¶ 40. 
LEGAL STANDARDS ON A MOTION TO DISMISS 
 To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must “contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  A claim is 
plausible on its face only if the “plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id.  The Court is 
not “required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 
fact, or unreasonable inferences.”  Rieckborn v. Jefferies LLC, 81 F. Supp. 3d 902, 913 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015) (quoting In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008)).  Nor is 
the Court “bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”  
Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting 
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Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).  “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
 Given “the extreme nature of the charge of terrorism,” it is especially important in an 
action brought under the Terrorism Civil Remedy Provision that the Court take special care to 
ensure that the plaintiff has satisfied these basic pleading requirements.  In re Terrorist Attacks 
on Sept. 11, 2001 (Burnett), 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 714 F.3d 118 (2d 
Cir. 2013).  In such an action, “‘fairness requires extra-careful scrutiny of Plaintiff[’s] 
allegations.’”  Id. 
 Section 230 requires dismissal at the threshold pleading stage where, as here, the 
defendant’s entitlement to immunity “is evident from the face of the complaint.”  Klayman v. 
Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also Fair Housing Council of San 
Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(Section 230 “protect[s] websites not merely from ultimate liability, but [also] from having to 
fight costly and protracted legal battles.”). 
ARGUMENT 
 The Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed for the same two independent 
reasons that this Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint.  First, Section 230 bars 
Plaintiffs’ claims because they continue to seek to hold Twitter liable for harms allegedly arising 
from content created by third parties and for Twitter’s publishing conduct with respect to that 
content.  Second, the Second Amended Complaint again fails to plead facts sufficient to establish 
an essential element of the Terrorism Civil Remedy Provision: that Twitter’s own conduct 
proximately caused the deaths of Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach.2 
                                                 
2 Twitter also incorporates and thereby preserves all of the arguments made in its motion to 
dismiss the FAC, including the argument that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that would 
establish that Twitter committed an act of “international terrorism” within the meaning of 18 
U.S.C. § 2331(1), as the Terrorism Civil Remedy Provision requires.  See Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 
No. 27, at 23-25; Reply, Dkt. No. 32, at 13-15.  Nothing in the SAC cures that additional and 
independently dispositive defect. 
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I. Section 230 Requires Dismissal Of Plaintiffs’ Claims 
 Section 230 “immunizes providers of interactive computer services against liability 
arising from content created by third parties.”  Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162.  As this 
Court’s prior dismissal ruling recognized, this immunity provision mandates dismissal when 
(1) the defendant is a “provider … of an interactive computer service”; (2) the allegedly harmful 
content at issue was “provided by another information content provider,” and not the defendant; 
and (3) the plaintiff is seeking to hold the defendant liable as a “publisher or speaker” of that 
content.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); Fields, 2016 WL 4205687, at *5; see also Barnes, 570 F.3d at 
1100-1101.  There is no dispute in this case that “Twitter is an interactive computer service 
provider, or that the offending content highlighted in the FAC [and now the SAC] was provided 
by another information content provider.”  Fields, 2016 WL 4205687, at *4; see also Mot. to 
Dismiss, Dkt. No. 27 at 12-13.  The only element of immunity Plaintiffs have ever disputed is 
“whether [their claims] seek to treat Twitter as a publisher or speaker.”  Fields, 2016 WL 
4205687, at *4. 
This Court held that the claims in the FAC did seek to treat Twitter as a publisher and 
were therefore barred by Section 230 for three reasons: (1) as actually pled, the claims in the 
FAC sought to hold Twitter liable for third-party content, Fields, 2016 WL 4205687, at *5-*6; 
(2) holding Twitter liable for its decisions about whether particular third parties may open or 
maintain Twitter accounts inherently would be based on a duty derived from Twitter’s “status or 
conduct as a publisher,” and thereby necessarily (and impermissibly) treat it as a publisher of 
third-party content, id. at *6-*8; and (3) Plaintiffs had not and could not establish proximate 
cause without relying on third-party content.  Id. at *8-*9.  The claims alleged in the SAC are 
barred for these same reasons. 
A. The Allegations Actually Pled In The Second Amended Complaint Continue 
To Premise Liability On Third-Party Content 
The SAC, like the FAC, continues to “describe a theory of liability based on Twitter’s 
knowing failure to prevent ISIS from disseminating content through the Twitter platform.”  
Fields, 2016 WL 4205687, at *5.  The SAC’s new structure does not remedy that fundamental 
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defect.  “To be sure,” the SAC, like the FAC, includes “some allegations … concerning Twitter’s 
provision of accounts to ISIS.”  Id.  Indeed, every allegation in the SAC about provision of 
accounts is identical to or derived from a corresponding allegation in the FAC.  Compare SAC 
¶¶ 9-13, 20, 24, 29, 30, 32, 38, 39, 40, 43, 48, 56, 61, 66, 68, 69 with FAC ¶¶ 3-6, 20, 25, 33, 38, 
43, 45, 49, 53, 59, 60, 62, 68, 69, 70, 84.  But the SAC also contains, and necessarily relies on, 
“detailed descriptions of ISIS-related messages, images, and videos disseminated through 
Twitter and the harms allegedly caused by the dissemination of that content.”  Fields, 2016 WL 
4205687, at *6; see also SAC ¶¶ 41-71.  And notably, the SAC continues to “specifically fault[] 
Twitter for failing to detect and prevent the dissemination of ISIS-related content through the 
Twitter platform.”  Fields, 2016 WL 4205687, at *6 (citing FAC ¶ 60 (Twitter “failed to respond 
to pleas to shut down clear incitements to violence”) and ¶ 66 (Twitter “does not actively 
monitor and will not censor user content”)); see also SAC ¶¶ 30, 36 (reproducing verbatim FAC 
¶¶ 60, 66); id. ¶¶ 32, 37 (further criticizing Twitter for inadequately policing content).  The SAC 
in fact adds an allegation concerning Twitter’s alleged failure to prevent the dissemination of 
ISIS-related content on its platform.  SAC ¶ 40 (“[J]ust this month, Twitter announced that it has 
suspended 235,000 accounts since February for promoting terrorism, something that it 
previously refused to do.” (emphasis added)). 3 
                                                 
3 While its falsity does not affect the legal analysis of this motion, the SAC’s allegation that 
Twitter had “previously refused” to suspend accounts for promoting terrorism is simply untrue.  
Both the FAC and the SAC elsewhere acknowledge earlier efforts by Twitter to “shut down” 
ISIS-related accounts.  SAC ¶ 39; FAC ¶ 69.  And as explained in the Twitter blog post from 
which the SAC plucked the 235,000 number, Twitter had, during the half-year before February 
2016, suspended 125,000 accounts for violating rules banning terrorist content on the Twitter 
platform.  See Twitter, An update on our efforts to combat violent extremism, available at 
https://blog.twitter.com/2016/an-update-on-our-efforts-to-combat-violent-extremism (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2016).  The Twitter Rules have always banned content that encourages terrorism under 
rules prohibiting “threats,” as well as use of the platform “for any unlawful purposes or in 
furtherance of illegal activities,” and have since April 2015 made that ban even more explicit by 
expressly prohibiting “threats of violence … including threatening or promoting terrorism.”  See 
Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 27 at 6-7 & n.3.   
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The sole difference between the FAC and the SAC with respect to third-party content is 
that instead of scattering allegations about third-party content throughout the complaint, the SAC 
deploys nearly all of those allegations in only two places:  to support Plaintiffs’ assertion that 
Twitter proximately caused Mr. Creach and Mr. Fields’ deaths, see SAC ¶¶ 41-71, and to 
describe the steps that Twitter allegedly failed to take to drive ISIS content from its platform, id. 
¶¶ 30, 32, 36, 37, 40.  Section 230 immunity, however, does not turn on and off based on how a 
plaintiff arranges her complaint; “‘creative’ pleading” cannot “circumvent [Section 230’s] 
protections.”  Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., __F.3d__, 2016 WL 4729492 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 2016) (Nos. 
14-35487, 14-35494) (slip op. 1) (rejecting attempt “to plead around [Section 230] to advance 
the same basic argument that the statute plainly bars”); see, e.g., Barnes, 570 F.2d at 1102-1103; 
Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2016); Doe v. MySpace, 528 
F.3d 413, 419-420 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 27 at 14-16; Reply, Dkt. 
No. 32 at 2-3.  Rather, “what matters is whether the cause of action inherently requires the court 
to treat the defendant as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by another.”  Barnes, 570 
F.3d at 1101-1102; see also Fields, 2016 WL 4205687, at *4.  As in the FAC, the entire premise 
of the SAC is that ISIS or its supporters used Twitter’s platform to spread their hateful messages, 
and that Twitter should have taken more aggressive steps to keep such harmful content off its 
platform.  Such claims by definition treat Twitter as the “publisher” of the content at issue—
exactly what Section 230 forbids.  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1103 (immunity extends to “‘any activity 
that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post 
online’”); see also Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 27 at 9, 14-15. 
B. Plaintiffs’ Accounts-Provision Theory Still Impermissibly Treats Twitter As 
A Publisher Of Third-Party Content 
 Plaintiffs’ efforts to further highlight their provision of accounts theory also do not cure 
the second problem identified by this Court:  on its own terms, the provision of accounts theory 
of liability is barred by Section 230.  As this Court held, “decisions about whether particular 
third parties may have Twitter accounts” are no different, for purposes of Section 230 immunity, 
from decisions about “what particular third-party content may be posted.”  Fields, 2016 WL 
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4205687, at *6.  Both decisions fundamentally are decisions to permit third parties to post 
content, “it is just that under plaintiffs’ provision of accounts theory, Twitter would be liable for 
granting permission to post (through the provision of Twitter accounts) instead of for allowing 
postings that have already occurred.”  Id.  Imposing liability on Twitter for failing to block 
accounts allegedly associated with ISIS would “significantly affect Twitter’s monitoring and 
publication of third-party content by effectively requiring Twitter to police and restrict its 
provision of Twitter accounts.”  Id. at *8.  The provision of accounts theory is thus “based on 
Twitter’s alleged violation of a ‘duty … derive[d] from [its] status or conduct as a publisher.’”  
Id. at *6 (quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102); see also Reply, Dkt. No. 32 at 5-6.   
Indeed, Plaintiffs’ reorganization of the SAC only confirms that their claims 
fundamentally rely on, and seek to hold Twitter liable for, content created by third parties.  
Plaintiffs ultimately seek to hold Twitter liable for failing to block accounts created by ISIS 
affiliates or supporters because these accounts were used to post content that ISIS has used to 
recruit new members, SAC ¶¶ 42-52, fundraise, id. ¶¶ 53-57, and spread propaganda, id. ¶¶ 58-
71.  That is, Plaintiffs seek to hold Twitter liable not merely because ISIS obtained and 
maintained Twitter accounts, but because ISIS transmitted content from those accounts.  Because 
the SAC attempts to resurrect the provision of accounts theory that this Court has already 
rejected, it should be dismissed. 
C. Plaintiffs’ Allegations About Proximate Causation Continue To Be Based On 
Third-Party Content 
 Finally, the SAC emphatically underscores that Plaintiffs cannot avoid relying on third-
party content because any hope they have of satisfying the causation element of the Terrorism 
Civil Remedy Provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, depends on such content.  This Court expressed 
skepticism that “a theory based on Twitter’s mere provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS” could 
“plausibly allege[] the causal connection necessary to support” liability under the Terrorism Civil 
Remedy Provision.  See Fields, 2016 WL 4205687, at *9 & n.4.  The Court noted that Plaintiffs 
had heavily relied on content-based arguments in attempting to establish proximate causation.  
Fields, 2016 WL 4205687, at *8 (“The rest of plaintiffs’ arguments and allegations with respect 
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to proximate causation are similarly content-based.”).  And the Court asked how “Twitter’s mere 
provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS—conduct that allegedly created liability before ‘the 
publication of any content’ and would support liability ‘[e]ven if ISIS had never issued a single 
tweet,’—[could have] proximately caused the November 2015 shooting”?  Id. (quoting Opp’n, 
Dkt. No. 31 at 7-8).  Plaintiffs have now answered that question by doubling-down on their use 
of third-party content to attempt to satisfy the Terrorism Civil Remedy Provision’s proximate 
cause requirement.  See SAC ¶¶ 41-71.  This overt and overwhelming reliance on third-party 
content confirms that Plaintiff’s claims “inherently require[] the court to treat [Defendants] as the 
‘publisher or speaker’ of content provided by another.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101-1102; see also 
Reply, Dkt. No. 32 at 3-4.  For this and the other reasons discussed above and in Twitter’s 
previous briefs, Section 230 bars Plaintiffs’ claims. 
II. The Second Amended Complaint Still Fails To Allege Facts Plausibly Establishing 
That Twitter Proximately Caused The Deaths Of Mr. Fields And Mr. Creach 
 The Second Amended Complaint also must be dismissed for a second reason identified in 
this Court’s Order dismissing the FAC:  The SAC fails to state a claim for relief under the 
Terrorism Civil Remedy Provision because it fails to plead facts sufficient to plausibly establish 
that Plaintiffs were injured “by reason of” Twitter’s conduct.  See Fields, 2016 WL 4205687, at 
*8-*9. 
 The Terrorism Civil Remedy Provision’s “‘by reason of’ language … restricts the 
imposition of … liability [under the statute] to situations where plaintiffs plausibly allege that 
defendants actions proximately caused their injuries.”  In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 
(Al Rajhi Bank), 714 F.3d 118, 123-125 (2d Cir. 2013).  As this Court noted, the parties “dispute 
the exact formulation of the appropriate causal test for civil liability under the ATA, [but] agree 
that the statute requires a showing of proximate causation.”  Fields, 2016 WL 4205687, at *8.  
But “[e]ven under plaintiffs’ proposed ‘substantial factor’ test,’” and “regardless of the particular 
theory of liability [asserted by] plaintiffs,” the allegations “do not support a plausible inference 
of proximate causation between Twitter’s provision of accounts to ISIS and the deaths of Fields 
and Creach.”  Id.  
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 Plaintiffs’ attempt to cure this additional dispositive defect is to no avail.  Even as 
between Abu Zaid and ISIS, the sole connection proffered by the SAC is that Abu Zaid, 
according to Israeli military intelligence, once belonged to a clandestine ISIS terrorist cell.  SAC 
¶ 81.  This allegation replaces the allegation in the FAC that Abu Zaid was a “lone wolf,” FAC 
¶ 80, who, according to his brother, had been moved by “ISIS’s brutal execution of Jordanian 
pilot Maaz al-Kassasbeh in February 2015,” id. ¶ 84.  Whatever this new alleged connection 
means for the link between Abu Zaid and ISIS, it still leaves any connection between Abu Zaid 
and Twitter  “tenuous at best.”  Fields, 2016 WL 4205687, at *8.  As before, “Plaintiffs do not 
allege that ISIS recruited or communicated with Abu Zaid over Twitter, that ISIS or Abu Zaid 
used Twitter to plan, carry out, or raise funds for the attack, or that Abu Zaid ever viewed ISIS-
related content on Twitter or even had a Twitter account.”  Id. at *1.  There is, in sum, no 
allegation linking Twitter to Abu Zaid at all.  The “causal connection” on which the SAC relies 
is thus “too speculative [and] attenuated to raise a plausible inference of proximate causation.”  
Fields, 2016 WL 4205687, at *8 n.4. 
 It is hardly surprising that this “new” factual allegation should fail to change the outcome 
reached by the Court in its dismissal order.  The Court’s analysis did not rely on the assumption 
that Abu Zaid was a “lone wolf” without connection to ISIS, see Fields, 2016 WL 4205687, at 
*8-*9, and the Court was aware when issuing its decision of the purported Israeli intelligence on 
which Plaintiffs rely.  See Mot. to Dismiss Hearing Tr., Dkt. 40, 14:9-11 (“[W]e’ve now come 
across evidence from Israeli military intelligence that the shooter in this case … was part of an 
ISIS sleeper cell.”).  Because the SAC still fails to “plausibly allege[] the causal connection” 
necessary to support a claim under the Terrorism Civil Remedy Provision, it should be dismissed 
for this reason as well.4 
                                                 
4 Twitter incorporates and thereby preserves the additional argument, not reached by the Court’s 
dismissal order, that only a “direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct 
alleged” is sufficient to satisfy the Terrorism Civil Remedy’s “by reason of” requirement.  
Holmes v. Secur. Inv. Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992); see also Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 
No. 27, at 21; Reply, Dkt. No. 32, at 11. 
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III. No Further Amendment Should Be Permitted 
 When a district court has already granted leave to amend, its discretion to deny further 
amendment is “‘particularly broad.’”  Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 
351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996).  Leave to amend should be denied when amendment would be 
futile, see id. at 355-356, especially where, as here, a plaintiff has failed to cure defects 
previously identified by the Court, In re Splash Tech. Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 
1059, 1071-1072 (N.D. Cal. 2001), or has continued to advance a theory that the Court has 
already rejected, Stearns v. Select Comfort Retail Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 
2010); Scognamillo v. Credit Suisse First Boston, LLC, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1159 (N.D. Cal. 
2008). 
Plaintiffs have now tried and failed three times to construct viable claims:  once in the 
original Complaint, Dkt. No. 1; again in the First Amended Complaint filed in response to 
Twitter’s first motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 21; and once again in the Second Amended Complaint 
filed in response to this Court’s dismissal order, Dkt. No. 48.  Each iteration has introduced only 
minor changes.  Nothing would be gained and much time and expense would be lost were this 
Court to give Plaintiffs a fourth bite at the apple.  Leave for any further amendment should 
therefore be denied.      
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the SAC should be dismissed.  And because any further 
amendments would be just as futile as Plaintiffs’ now three attempts to state a claim, dismissal 
should be with prejudice.   
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